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ABSTRACT 
 
Human rights movement dominates over how people articulate their 
interests to be heard. It controls massive resources in the name of those 
interests. This dissertation articulates a path for new emancipation projects 
to hinder the domination of the human rights movement. Devotion to the 
movement maintains the illusion of objectifying people’s interests outside 
politics. Though, the movement fails to deliver on that objectification when 
activists choose between competing interests, deferring their failures to the 
future. That temporal space holds the movement’s universal claim. The 
instability of the movement lies in the gap between what it promises and 
what it delivers, creating its emancipatory and imperial sides. I argue that 
the present gets filled up with development towards economic growth, 
which justifies the universal claims of the movement while the movement 
justifies the absence of development. The movement acquires the role of 
representing the universal function with the aid of development. Power 
holds that representation, which becomes contingent. The contingency of 
the representation of the universal function is hopeful for different 
emancipation movements to compete along the human rights discourse. I 
retain the universal as an empty ground to disprove the fullness of the 
universal function. Then, I move to suggest that the Other, with the plurality 
inside that category, can either struggle for the representation for the 
universal function or for utilizing the emancipatory side of the rights 
discourse. I choose the former. I urge new liberation projects to fight for the 
representation of the universal function, without essentializing the subaltern 
voices, since all Other(s) can struggle their way(s) towards new forms of 
dominations. Essentializing the subaltern voices within the plurality gains 
them recognition within the hegemonic. But, I fight for the liberation in 
struggling rather than recognition; for the Other(s)’ laments to dominate 
over the rights’ laments.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Everyday Muslims start their daily prayers with verses of Al-Fatihah, the opener. 
They start by thanking God for what they have and for his mercy: 
 
In the name of Allah, the Entirely Merciful, the 
Especially Merciful. (1:1)  
[All] praise is [due] to Allah, Lord of the worlds 
(1:2)  
The Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful, 
(1:3)  
Sovereign of the Day of Recompense. (1:4) 
It is You we worship and You we ask for help. 
(1:5) 
Guide us to the straight path – (1:6) 
The path of those upon whom You have bestowed 
favor, not of those who have evoked [Your] anger 
or of those who are astray. (1:7) 
 
Muslims are obliged to recite these verses regularly in their prayers. The significance 
of these verses rests in the life that Islam shapes. Islam does not shape life around 
relief from struggles but how to deal with struggles.  
 
Material prosperity is not the only goal in the world. Muslims start their prayers by 
thanking for what they have, not asking for more. The obligation to recite these verses 
is a reminder that there is another lifestyle that does not revolve around material gain.  
 
While Muslims are encouraged to ask God for material prosperity, or anything else, 
the Quran stresses the importance of a sense of content with one’s current situation. It 
also notes that material well-being does not relieve all struggles. Islam advocates for a 
mindset that prepares one for the hardships of life. It is from this background that I 
write my dissertation.  
 
This dissertation shatters the illusions that revolve around eliminating hardships, to 
advocate for embracing those hardships and find a way to work through them towards 
new hardships. The human rights movement only works around those hardships. It 
does not address them; nevertheless it claims to solve them. But the movement cannot 
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solve what it avoids. Human rights movement rejects hardships as if the rights 
discourse can eliminate them. It cannot face hardships if it defines them around 
eliminating them for hardships persist with life. Islam highlights that clearly. No 
matter how hard you pray, though you will be rewarded, but you will always face 
hardships along with reliefs.  
 
Thus, this dissertation moves closer towards realities with their uncertainties. I frame 
my path of emancipation around accepting hardships. I reject the illusions of the 
human rights movement only to see what it can offer the Other(s). But I do not reject 
the rights discourse but its domination. Nevertheless, I favor new ways of struggling 
that can bring life to struggling and not reject struggling as part of life.  
 
In part one, I discuss the promises of human rights activists. The first section 
introduces those promises. Human rights believers act as if rights are the way out of 
struggles. They promise material well-being as an answer to those struggles. They 
assume that they attain a rights’ space that can maintain its objectivity against states’ 
politics. The next two sections negate the stability of the movement’s space and 
promises. The universality of the human rights movement is contingent. The 
contingency becomes visible when the movement fails to deliver its promises. 
Contemporary human rights discourse becomes less utopian and more about political 
struggles. The assumed concreteness of human rights shatters within its 
institutionalization.  
 
The third section focuses on the space that activists attempt to disguise. The gap 
between what the movement promises and what it delivers gets filled up with the 
promises of development. Development functions as a disguise of the universality of 
the movement. But development is not a path for all. The human rights movement 
justifies the failures of development to disguise its particularity. The relationship 
between the movement and development is symbiotic. Development is a path in 
which some get the privileges and others get more struggles. And that particularity is 
natural. Devotion to the universality of the movement and of development is 
mandatory to attain their rhetorical power. But those devotions can be contested. 
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Thus, I argue that human rights discourse is not the ‘true’ universal, but rather a 
representation of the universal function.  
 
In part two, I articulate the emptiness of the universal realm in finitude. The universal 
I am speaking of is a universal with no ground, an empty one. Human rights discourse 
is just a representation of the universal function. The universal function is the term I 
utilize to denote to the role that the human rights movement (or any particular 
identity) plays when it acquires power. The contingency of representing the universal 
function allows claims against the identities that fill it up. The articulation of the 
universal as empty problematizes the identity that personifies the universal; for it is 
never free of its particularity to become the universal. We strive to a more inclusive 
rights discourse that is, though we work for it, is impossible to reach.  
 
Thus, I escalate the contingency in human rights discourse towards its emancipatory 
side. I suggest that human rights discourse needs to engage with its contingency to be 
more emancipatory and less imperial. The discourse engages with its liberating side 
when it claims universality and its imperial side when it shows its particularity. It 
becomes a representation of what the universal can look like. Thus, although we can 
strive for a better universal than the current one, it will only be better for some, and 
worse for others. 
 
In part three, I suggest two paths for challenging the movement’s imperial side but I 
choose one. The Other, as a plural category, can utilize rights as a language for their 
struggles within current dominations. But they will still face the same struggles. They 
dedicate to the imperial and emancipatory side of the movement. The dissertation 
urges the Others to strive to dominate the universal representation; to utilize new 
emancipation discourses. The end is not a cheerful result to the eradication of political 
struggles, but to more possibilities for better uncertainties in favor of the plurality of 
the Other. 
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II. On Devotions and Illusions 
 
To overthrow idols (my word 
for ‘ideals’)- that’s rather my 
business. 1 
  
 
UNICEF recently launched a campaign to spread awareness about child abuse under 
the name: fight unfair.2 In Egypt, the campaign shows different celebrities with facts 
on child abuse underneath their pictures. The facts address the rates of physical abuse, 
healthcare issues, lack of safe shelter, malnutrition, and forced labor. The campaign 
went viral over social media.  
 
What caught my eyes were the comments that focused on the pointless side of the 
campaign. “What is the point of this?” “What did the UNICEF do from its 
establishment till now?” “What can we do?” “Do you know that there are more 
problems than what you mention?” “We saw worse than what you are 
describing.”3UNICEF’s representatives answer by either “please spread our 
campaign,” or “you can take a look at our website.” And of course there were some 
applauding voices that the representatives thanked gratefully for their good vibes.  
 
But truly what did the UNICEF do? I opened their website on Egypt to see their 
accomplishments so far. Their “Our Work” section is filled with more facts and their 
partnerships with ministries and big companies in Egypt.4 It is ironic that their 
accomplishments are facts about child abuse that they try to spread. But it is clear 
from the comments that people already know that child abuse exists. They even saw 
worse! 
 
This irony sums up the first part of my dissertation. It is the irony that human rights 
movement makes us applaud, believe in, and hope to achieve: to spread facts. 
 
                                     
1Fredrich Nietzche, WHY AM I SO WISE, at 4.  
2UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/fightunfair/, accessed at 19 December, 2015. 
3 I translated all the comments. They can be found in their Facebook page under the hash tag #FightUnfair.  
4 UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/egypt/activities.html, accessed at 19 December, 2015. 
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The human rights movement became mainstream because of that irony. It galvanized 
our devotions to our interests. It colonizes our responses to the injustice of the state 
administration and the international community.  
 
It claims universality. It claims to protect our interests from political institutions. And 
it claims its own space above politics 
 
The first part of that claim is the objective of the movement. The movement makes us 
express our interests in the language of rights. That is its objective. It is to concretize 
facts about our interests, like the UNICEF does with child abuse.  
 
Thus, our interests become obscured in the language of rights. Rights become the 
goal. So we get to say we have rights. But we do not have our interests. We are left 
with “what is the point of this.” We already knew our interest.5 
 
To answer that, the movement projects our interest to the future. The answer becomes 
“spread awareness about our cause and everything will work out eventually.” This 
temporal space makes it possible for us to believe in the human rights movement. We 
believe change will come. Change is always deferred to the future. There is a split 
between what human rights offer us in the present, and what human rights promise us 
to happen in the future. 6 We get struggles in the present though we are promised a 
relief:  
 
What we get in the present is development. It controls our paths of change. But not all 
of us can develop. Resources on earth are limited. Only some can be labeled 
‘developed.”7 Though we know that, development seduces us into thinking it is 
coming. “And yet the vast majority of the world’s natural resources are extracted 
                                     
5 Tshepo makes the same argument about how human rights movement shapes the victims it addresses, forgetting 
the victim already exists with her interests. He calls it the “theft of victims’ pain”, in: Tshepo Madlingozi, On 
Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims, J. of Human Rights Practice, Vol.2.2, 2010. 
6 See, Barbara Stark, Jam Tomorrow: Distributive Justice and the Limits of International Economic law, Third 
World L.J. 3, 2010. 
7 Id. at 15-22. 
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from the ‘developing world’, whilst the vast majority of said resources are consumed 
in the developed world.”8 
 
That is why all UNICEF can and will offer is facts. It cannot offer more than 
economic growth gives a nation.  
 
Thus, the second part of the universal claim, the universal space of human rights, 
falls. Human rights movement no longer operates in an exclusive space but it shares it 
with development and economic growth. Therefore, this part of the dissertation 
concludes with the fall of the universal claim of human rights movement.  
 
A. Institutional Devotion  
 
In exploring human rights right in the contemporary sense, I engage with how it 
became part of our everyday life engagement with the state. I am interested in how 
the language of rights became “mainstream;” how it adapts to state bureaucratization 
and international institutions; how “the reorganization, improvement, development 
and evaluation of policy processes, so that a human rights perspective is incorporated 
in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-
making” became ‘vital’ 9  
 
I argue that the language of rights was mainstream all along. It did not need to be 
assimilated by the state to conceive the same spreading effect. Human rights discourse 
intoxicated our existence ever since the movement started in 20th century. Engle 
contends:  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, human rights has become the lingua 
franca of both states and social movements, from the left to the 
right. With regards to the former, states claim to intervene- even 
militarily- in other states to protect human rights, and states resist 
such intervention in the name of human rights. Social Movements 
                                     
8 Jason A. Beckett, Faith and Resignation, a Journey Through Public International Law.  
9 I am taking on McCrudden’s mainstream: “the reorganization, improvement, development and evaluation of 
policy processes, so that a human rights perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by 
the actors normally involved in policy-making” in: Christopher McCrudden, Mainstreaming Human Rights, at 3. 
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of all stripes also frame their claims in human rights terms. Even 
arguments for significant redistribution of wealth and resources are 
largely made in the name of (economic and social) human 
rights….10  
 
For Engle, the language of rights has the same rhetoric whether articulated by the 
state, social movements, or even leftist critique to the language itself. In that equation 
of utterance, the language of rights legitimates the neoliberal, market friendly 
individual.11 These institutions address the consumers in us. And the language of 
rights addresses the same people with the same neoliberal logic.  
 
But that equation does not differentiate between human rights seizing legitimation 
from the ruling rationalities and the language of rights as a language of struggles. The 
language of rights can exist without any institutional powers. It can oppose the 
mainstream,12 the legitimated interests, and the dogmatic market friendly individual.  
 
Therefore, I choose to make a distinction between mainstreaming human rights 
movement, as part of the ruling rationalities, and human rights as a language for 
struggles. 
 
Mainstreaming human rights addresses rights discourse as a remedy for modern 
complex relations between individuals and the state institutions. The complexity 
arises from the way everything is interconnected towards development, in modernity. 
State institutions invest in standards that guarantee development and economic 
growth. They follow international standards of governing, including strengthening the 
rule of law. Laws guarantee the predictability that the market needs to function. But 
laws had to be less formal to cope with the instabilities of the economy. 
 
“Deformalizing” the rule of law was necessary to balance the complexities of 
relations that came with modernity.13 Courts needed principles that are not rigid to 
allow a reasonable application of laws. The market requires solutions that are logical 
                                     
10 Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture EJIL 22 2011 at 158. 
11 Id. at 160. 
12 Similarly, O’Connell argues that new conceptions of socio-economic rights can exist outside their subordination 
of courthouse, in: See, Paul O’Connell, The Death of Socio-Economic Rights, The Modern L.R., 2011, 532-554 
13 Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Project of Power, 2006 at 1. 
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and fit the problem. Laws became like guidelines for these solutions. These solutions 
were not determinate but based on each case, so the market can function freely. 
Consequently, the solutions formed new guidelines to solving cases.  
 
Injustice was possible because of the deformalized rule of law. Though the solutions 
were reasonable for the market, they did not care for the interest of the individual. 
Taking away a property from an individual and giving her compensation is 
reasonable. Her land transforms to a big manufacturing complex, providing work for 
thousands and tax revenues for the government. But perhaps she did not want to give 
up her house.  
 
Rights emerged to articulate interests against the reasonable interests of the state 
market economy: 
 
Human rights law emerged in the 1960’s and 1970s to empower 
groups and interests that were now well-represented in the 
bureaucratic or administrative bodies whose task it was to balance 
conflicting objectives that stood behind legislation. It gave 
expression to concerns such as: “indigenous groups should not be 
forced to leave their homes only because it might be cost-effective 
to set up an industrial area in the place where they live. They have 
a right to live there”, or “the police may not torture crime suspects 
however efficient that might be in view of the objectives of 
criminal policy. Torture is just plain wrong”.14    
 
Individuals may express their interests legitimately. The human rights movement 
presumed authorities should hear ‘I have a right to that property’ as loud as any other 
market efficient solution. Rights were the best instruments for advocating against 
administrative abuse15: 
Rights - entitlements that ground claims with a special force - are a 
particular kind of social practice. Human rights- equal and 
inalienable entitlements of all individuals that may be exercised 
                                     
14 Id. at 3. 
15 Similarly, Dworkin defines rights as trumping utilitarianism, in: Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at 
184- 205.  
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against the state and society- are a distinctive way to seek to realize 
social values such as justice and human flourishing.16   
Rights were the rhetoric of counter-state power.17 To claim a right, means to take 
away something from the state institutions. Rights were concrete, formalized as in “I 
have a right!” They promised to remedy what states did in the name of the market.  
The movement assumes its own space apart from the state. It grounds human rights 
discourse in its universality.18 Likewise, Habermas invalidates states’ sovereignty, to 
pursue a global order that foresees the implementation of  “cosmopolitan law, a law 
that is deemed universally valid for all humans in all places at all times.”19 The rights 
space claims a ‘true’ universal status because of two reasons.  
Firstly the movement differentiates human rights from politics through asserting a 
‘rights space’ that is above political order. It creates a ground that is not affected by 
states’ politics. It also alienates rights from any type of moral claims to sustain the 
resonance of the universality of its space. For Habermas, “’the conception of human 
rights does not have its origins in morality’ but rather is ‘distinctly juridical in 
nature.’”20 It cannot be grounded on a certain moral claim that would deny it its own 
universality.  
Secondly, the movement came with an objective to concretize people’s interests 
against state/world/market injustice. It speaks of determinate interests that have 
nothing to do with the interests of the state.21  
Both aspects of the universal claim depend on each other. The objective depends on 
the existence of the rights space to function outside of state and economic interests. 
And that objective legitimizes the existence of the rights space to the believers when 
the movement is functioning within the interests it fights.  
I tackle the falsity of the objective of the movement, in the next section.  
                                     
16 Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, H.R.Q. 2007. 
17 Supra note 15. 
18 William Rasch, A just war? Or just a war? Schmitt vs Habermas, in SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS DISCONTENT, 2004, 
at 49-62.  
19 Id. at 52. 
20 Id. at 55. 
21 Similarly See, Martti Koskenniemi, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA to at 16- 58. 
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B. First Illusion: Flawed Objective 
The human rights movement maintains the concreteness that came with rights. It 
promises formality for the interest of individuals. That formality should win against 
rational market-friendly policies. But sets of rights started to emerge and coincide 
with each other. There was a lack of authority to tell the authentic rights from those 
that masked interests motivated by selfish agendas.  Thus, human rights activists 
establish which interests can transform to rights and which interests human rights 
fight. Also, they choose between contradictory sets of rights when they clash.22 
 
Activists maintained a reasonable balance between contradicting sets of rights. They 
dictate what is socially optimal and what is not. “To do good,” they have to define 
what is good. Is it good to focus on socio-economic rights or to focus on political-
civil rights, in Africa? What do African people need? Do they need the right to shelter 
more than the right to democracy? Do they need the right to democracy, as in more 
transparent elections? Or do they need the right to democracy, as in freedom of 
assembly? What does democracy mean in Africa? Activists construct the answers to 
these questions. They create the issues that need attention:  
 
The entire human rights structure is both anti-
catastrophic and reconstructive. It is anti-
catastrophic because it is designed to prevent more 
calamities through the creation of more victims. It 
is reconstructive because it seeks to re-engineer the 
state and the society to reduce the number of 
victims, as it defines them, and prevent conditions 
that give rise to more victims.23  
 
Activists define the limits of victimhood. Then they create solutions that eliminate 
those victimhoods matching their definition. 
 
                                     
22 Mieville argues that all efforts towards justice utilizing rights are misleading since activists make the decisions 
of what constitutes that justice, in: see Generally, China Mieville, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Brill Academic Publishers, 2004. For critique of Mieville’s proposition of rejecting 
emancipatory side of international law, see, Susan Marks, International Judicial Activism and the Commodity-
Form Theory of International law, EJIL, Vol. 18.1, 2007, 199-211. 
23 See, Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 Harv. Int’l L. J., 2001, 
203- 204. 
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Activists dictate the interests that they pursue. The particularity of the movement 
shows itself when believers have to decide on what grounds they would apply/ reach/ 
interpret those interests, which became rights. The believers make decisions. They 
have to choose who to help; how to help; what is help; when to help. They establish 
guidelines for help, as they know how to help: by utilizing human rights. They 
determine what they are doing. They become subjective.24 They privilege the interests 
of some at the expense of others.25 
 
Thus, activists always justify and legitimate their choices. They validate what they 
choose to be socially optimal. Their subjectivity cannot be allowed to show, because 
it destabilizes the constructed rights space. So they justify their subjectivity. 
Justifications for the subjectivity appear in the form of ‘we need better human rights.’  
 
Devotion to the movement entails covering its own particularity. Whatever goes 
wrong does not mean the movement itself is flawed. It puts the blame on states 
intervening or the lack of rights or on wrong implementation or just because we need 
to try harder!26 People can have the right to water but they still are denied access to 
clean water. Rights do not give them water. They are only a form of expressing their 
interests. But still activists presume that entitling people the right to water is the goal 
not the interests themselves (clean water).  
 
Determinacy of the movement’s objective depends on devotion: on professionalism. 
“Determinacy depends on the acceptance of the chain of justifications by the relevant 
reference group.”27 Human rights activists become the reference group who determine 
what is ‘rationally acceptable’ to reach their goals.  
 
Human rights become a language for experts. Professionalization of the human rights 
discourse is part of the problem within the movement.28 Professionalization 
                                     
24 Seriously if you look at different ‘our mission’ pages for NGOs you would find subjectivity all over. In their 
missions, they dictate what a right means to a certain community. For example how Oxfam thinks it tackles 
poverty in: https://www.oxfam.org/en/explore/how-oxfam-fights-poverty, accessed December 12, 2015. 
25 Koskenniemi, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
26 That would be the part when human rights activists need to take a breath. 
27 Koskenniemi, supra note 21 at 36. 
28 David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Part of the Problem?, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J., 2002, at 119. 
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encourages formalization, through relying on solid conventions of human rights, 
which are inherently ambiguous. Activists fill in the ambiguity. They dictate the 
interests the conventions hold.29 
 
The methods of the movement are transformed into the objective of the movement. 
Giving people rights becomes the goal. People think they get access to water after 
having the right to water. But no, the goal is the right to water and not water itself. 
But the movement is supposed to give them their interests not labels.30 
 
A refugee for example, in her eligibility to become a refugee is detached both from 
her original status in her state and the current state she seeks asylum in. She is labeled 
a refugee. As if that label has magical powers to solve her problem. Recognition of 
the refugee as a refugee is the main goal. Kennedy acknowledges:  
 
Even very broad social movements of emancipation- for 
women, for minorities of various sorts, for the poor- have their 
vision blinkered by the promise of recognition in the 
vocabulary and institutional apparatus of human rights. They 
will be led away from the economy and toward the state, away 
from political/social conditions and toward the forms of legal 
recognition.31  
 
Human rights advocates who want to help get submerged with the demands of this 
label. They forget the actual needs of the ‘refugee’.  
 
Human rights activists establish the identity of the individual within the institution of 
human rights. Professionalism creates a chasm between the real human (the actual 
person who seeks asylum) and the refugee of human rights. They do not speak of the 
individual’s interests but frame and limit those interests in the category of a refugee. 
The more bureaucratic and professional human rights movement becomes, the less 
emancipatory it can be. Activists become the limits of the rights discourse as they 
                                     
29 The “fantasy” of solid conventions is always met with “the unredeemed reality of political machination,” in: 
See, Jason Beckett, The Economics of Fantasy, ESIL, 2012. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 110. 
  
 
13 
personify the usefulness of those rights. They reflect their own training capabilities 
within the institutionalized movement.  
 
Thus, rights become empty of what they are supposed to do. They promise more than 
they can deliver for interests of the person labeled a refugee. They can only deliver a 
status for the refugee but not a decent life or survival.  
 
Moreover, interests have to be expressed in the language of rights to be acknowledged 
as interests. They need to attract the movement’s resources. So interests transform 
from the political realm to become a right in its own presumed space, in order to be 
heard.  
 
Consequently, human rights movement dominates resources in the name of 
emancipation. 
For Kennedy, human rights do not have any whimsy to them: 
 
As a dominant and fashionable vocabulary for thinking about 
emancipation, human rights crowds out other ways of 
understanding harm and recompense. This is easiest to see 
when human rights attracts institutional energy and resources 
that would otherwise flow elsewhere.32 
 
Kennedy wants a pragmatic engagement with human rights movement. He 
acknowledges the distribution of power within the movement.33 There are political 
costs for the decisions human rights activists take within the movement.  
 
Thus, Kennedy looks at different sets of human rights to see the distributive outcome 
of those sets. Everything becomes about competing priorities. Economic and social 
rights conflict with political and civil rights. Economic and social rights are about 
development and change as they redistribute resources. While political and civil rights 
seek to maintain the status quo. The choice between different sets of human rights is 
unjustifiable but political. So we need to focus on the cost of choosing between them. 
                                     
32 Id. at 108. 
33 Id. at 102. 
  
 
14 
Concretizing interests becomes an illusion when the activists have to either ground 
human rights in transcendental specter or in a political aporia to reach their goals. 
 
Thus, I will tackle the domain that human rights movement functions in to make its 
decisions between different sets of rights. The cost of these sets is the inequality 
between West and Non-West. The inequality is an outcome of 
liberal/western/capitalist values that assimilate to human rights movement, 34 as I will 
argue next.  
 
C. Second Illusion: Flawed Space 
 
From the start, the human rights movement projects the realization of universality to 
the fulfillment of its goals/objective. Whatever is flawed now will be solved. 
Justifications made it possible for the movement to claim a true universal status. 
Hence, determinacy, in the form of devotion, does not eliminate the particularity but 
makes it worse. It makes it possible for the movement to claim a ‘true’ universal 
status. The movement played on the temporal space to create justifications for its 
failures when it shows its particularity. The flaws of the present will, surely, be 
promised resolution in the future to come. 
 
Development and economic growth fills up the temporal dimension that was created 
by the future goals. Modernity created that temporal space with development and it 
continued through the uncertainties of existence in post-modernity.  
 
The split between what human rights claim and what they deliver introduces the 
critical instability of human rights discourse. The split is a product of claiming a 
rights space above politics. Thus, when contemporary human rights discourse 
(re)presents itself as the true universal, the split between its claim and its particularity 
fills up with the rationalities of development and economic growth.35  
 
                                     
34 Id. at 115-116. 
35 Sundhya Pahuja, DECOLONIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW, Cambridge University Press, 2011, at 38. 
  
 
15 
Hence, human rights discourse becomes both liberating and imperial. 36 It becomes 
imperial when it shows that it has a particular ground. It is liberating when it claims 
its true universality. The tension between both sides creates the critical instability. 
This critical instability lies at heart of the movement. It cannot be taken away.  
 
For Pahuja, the instability of human rights has a dual aspect to it.37 It is post-colonial 
and political: 
 
The ‘postcolonial’ quality of international law describes the way 
the law founds itself (rather than being founded on 
predetermined categories outside itself) and the way that self-
founding plays out in the historical context of the post-war 
world. The ‘political’ quality of international law describes the 
gap between the symbolic valence of international law, or its 
aspirational relationship to an idea of justice and the law as 
embodied in treaty and custom at any given moments.38  
 
Firstly, the post-colonial aspect of this instability erases the cuts that the universal 
human rights discourse makes to other values (other particular identities) when it 
claims universality. So for example, the West creates values that are quite ‘western’ 
to be applied universally. The Western values exclude all the other values. Though, 
the West includes the others in their application, erasing their exclusion from the 
values: “They are universal because they should apply to everyone. And why should 
they apply to everyone? Because they are universal.”39 It is that circular claim that 
invisibilises the exclusion of the other.  
 
This exclusion is a post-colonial legacy. After decolonization, new states were 
expected to fit in what is already there. They became states, in the modern sense. 
They joined civilization. They engaged with the human rights movement. They 
become part of the acclaimed ‘universal.’ But they did not (even help to) create that 
universal. 
 
                                     
36 See Generally, Id. 
37 Id. at 25. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 30. 
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So the instability here appears in the split between the claim to universality, and the 
particularity of human rights movement that silences other values.40  
 
Secondly, the political aspect of the critical instability promises justice. The human 
rights movement articulates calls for justice. It promises a transcendental justice that 
works for everyone. It articulates a justice that we all share. But we do not share this 
justice. This justice does not come from outside the rights discourse. It comes from 
within the movement. 
 
Accordingly, the justice of human rights is a constructed justice. The movement 
controls justice. It delivers a version of its justice; not transcendental justice. 
Likewise Koskenniemi argues what is just is read institutionally by “what seems to 
be required by justice.”41 And what justice requires is read by what is just. It is up to 
the state institutions to decide and produce justice in International law.42 
 
There is a gap between the justice that human rights create and justice as a 
transcendental notion that human rights promise. The gap between rights and justice 
constitutes an “autoimmune logic”43 meaning that rights’ own immunity, embodied 
in justice, is its own destruction. Human rights self-destruct when they call on justice 
to legitimize their promises because their transcendental justice does not exist. But 
they are still dependent on their claim of transcendental justice.  
 
Thus, the gap between the justice human rights offer, and justice as a transcendental 
ground creates the critical instability. The promises of human rights movement 
become deferred, because of the gap. The promises become a justice “to come,”44 
since it cannot be present. The deferral is not just to the future but also to the critical 
instability. The deferred promises stabilize the present towards development. 
                                     
40 Id. at 31-32. 
41 Koskenniemi, supra note 21, at 588. 
42 Id. at 583-589. 
43 Jacques Derrida, ROGUES: TWO ESSAYS ON REASON, Stanford University Press, 2005, at 36. 
44 Derrida argues the same for democracy since it depends on sovereignty but by evoking the concept of 
sovereignty is self-destructs because sovereignty takes away the ‘demos’ (people) out of democracy but still it 
needs sovereignty to have an effective ruling. So democracy becomes not only impossible but also differed 
towards uncertainty that is inside democracy: “The Democracy to come: it is necessary that it give the time there is 
not” See, id. at 1, 28-41. 
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Development and economic growth stabilize and fill up the splits of the critical 
instability. They feed on the split between what human rights movement promises 
and what it delivers. Development happens everywhere not just in the West. It affects 
the whole world and its institutions but the results are not the same for all nations.45 It 
has different outcomes. It implies that all humans are on a never-ending track towards 
growth.46 Development articulates a ‘true’ universal path in which human kind can 
escape to modernity where salvation centers on economic growth. Everyone must be 
on this track.  
 
Also, it implies a “desire to help” those who fall behind: “Europe will make a world 
of Africa.”47 Firstly, development was a reason to civilize, industrialize, and save the 
colonized territories.48 Colonial rules depended on the rational of good intentions 
towards the colonized to justify colonialism to their own people and to maintain the 
colonized elites. The colonized elites maintained the colonized masses.  
 
Then, development was naturalized with the League of Nations.49 The introduction of 
the mandate system as “sacred trusts of civilization”50 continued with development as 
the norm. It was the duty of the developed nations to make sure the new states are not 
deviating again to their ‘barbarism’. They had to look after them.  
 
Continuing the same rational with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
everyone has a share of what development has to offer. We all become equal. The 
infamous Point Four of President’s Truman inauguration marked the new age of 
development. In Point Four, “‘Underdevelopment’ was not the opposite of 
‘development’, only its incomplete … an acceleration of growth was thus the only 
logical way of bridging the gap.”51  
 
                                     
45 See generally, Gilbert Rist, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH, 1997. 
46 Id. at 27. 
47 Words of Victor Hugo in Rist: Id. at 51. 
48 Id. at 47-56. 
49 Id. at 58-65. 
50 Id. at 65. 
51 Id., at 74. 
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So being ‘under-developed’ is a stage that will wither away. The underdeveloped had 
new hopes of becoming more than they were. The hopes are deferred to a 
development, which is not present; but to a development to chase after in the future.  
 
Development justifies the failures of the present. “The strength of ‘development’ 
discourse comes of its power to seduce, in every sense of the term: to charm, to 
please, to fascinate, to set dreaming, but also to abuse, to turn away from the truth, to 
deceive.”52 It plays on the temporality of the rights discourse, through justifying the 
gap between the underdeveloped and the developed by promising a flourishing 
future. The underdeveloped have a future to look at amidst their current status.  
 
But, development brought with it a hierarchy of states according to their development 
status, which instantly gives power to the ‘developed’ over the ‘underdeveloped.’ It 
formalized hierarchies between new underdeveloped countries and the already 
developed West.53 Development meant power. Development also proclaimed 
economic growth as the universal goal. As a consequence, development is not empty. 
It has a goal to reach, regardless of whether that goal is attainable (for everyone) or 
not.  
 
Development hides the unattainability of its goal, economic growth. It focuses the 
attention on outcomes in the future. It depends on the temporal space that human 
rights create by their universal claim. It acts as if economic growth is coming. So, 
economic growth can happen if all nations just strive for it. Thus, it justifies the 
failures of economic growth in the present. 
 
Development stabilizes the present space of human rights discourse to utilize the 
discourse’s universal claim. Accordingly, development brought with it more than 
hope. It became the legitimate universal path to follow. It maintains its universal 
application through the temporal dimension of the rights discourse: through its 
always-deferred outcomes. 
 
                                     
52 Id, at 1. 
53 Pahuja, supra note 35, at 75-77. 
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There is mutual dependency between human rights movement and development. The 
movement depends on the deferred promises of development to justify its own 
failures in the present. Additionally, devotion to human rights movement also 
justifies the failures of economic growth; as adherence to human rights standards will 
presage development. So even as development justifies the shortcomings of the 
present by deferring its promises to the future utilizing the universal claim of human 
rights; the human rights movement justifies the universality of development when it 
disguises the unattainability of its goal.  
 
The goal, which development promises and human rights movement universalizes, is 
a lifestyle based on consumption of resources in a high rate. If everyone lived that 
way, we will need more resources than our planet can handle:   
 
The fact is, however, that this is not an achievable objective. Today 
20 per cent of humanity consumes 80 per cent of the planet’s 
resources, and finds itself having to boost growth to keep the 
system going. But it is not possible to mobilize at least four times 
more extra resources; the environment simply could not sustain it. 
Still one is required to act as if the belief were reasonable and the 
goal attainable.54  
 
Though, economic growth is unreachable for all. Earth cannot sustain us all to live 
like average Americans. Development becomes one of the myths of our time. 
 
Consequently, development constitutes the limits of human rights discourse. When 
Third World countries articulate their struggles with rights language, their voices 
have limited outcome. For example, when third world countries wanted to establish 
their sovereignty over their natural resources, their arguments over political 
sovereignty got displaced to consolidate with the ruling rationale.55  Their arguments 
transformed to foreign investments not political sovereignty. The outcome of 
establishing full political sovereignty over natural resources would affect foreign 
                                     
54 Rist, supra note 45, at 44-45. 
55 See, Pahuja, supra note 35, at 95-118 
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investments.56 Thus, the argument moved to a domain that conforms to development 
and economic growth. It became an issue that hinders foreign investments.  
 
Economic growth establishes the domain where human rights function. The rights 
space becomes not exclusive but flawed. The particularity of that space becomes 
visible. Though human rights discourse claims its own universal space, it still 
resonates between power struggles mystifying its justice that echoes in development. 
57 It engages with its particularity, destabilizing its true universal claim.  
 
Pahuja wants to continue working with the contingency of International Law and 
human rights. She wants to reshape their relation to the universal. She argues for a 
strategic engagement with this “critical instability” of human rights discourse, so the 
emancipatory nature of human rights is enhanced.58 Similarly Koskenniemi calls for a 
strategic return to human rights, as a language for struggles. To do so, the human 
rights movement has to stay away from assimilating with ruling rationalities and 
become a language that resists those rationalities.59  
 
I utilize those voices that want to rework a new understanding of rights discourse to 
shape an understanding of the universal realm that elevates differences rather than 
homogenise them. I sympathize with this path because it opens up the rights 
discourse to more than the current movement offers, which is beneficial for those 
who cannot afford to fight outside the rights discourse. It is less drastic than what I 
will propose in part three. I reformulate the human rights discourse’s universal claim 
to become a realm of contingent hope, in the next part.  
  
                                     
56 Id. 95-118 
57 See, Koskenniemi, supra note 21. 
58 Id. at 42-43. 
59 Koskenniemi, supra note 13, at 11. 
  
 
21 
 
III. A Realm of Contingent Hope 
 
“This universalism which is not One is no 
homecoming: a nostalgic return to a lost 
object which once (supposedly) provided a 
common origin or ground.”60 
 
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by 48 votes. But the Commission on Human Rights 
drafted the declaration with only 18 members.  
 
The Declaration is praised as the “holy writ within the human rights movement.”61 It 
marks a new vision for humanity. Everyone belonged to that vision. It is: 
 
A common standard of achievement for all peoples 
and all nations, to the end that every individual and 
every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these rights and 
freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and 
effective recognition and observance, both among 
the peoples of Member States themselves and 
among the peoples of territories under their 
jurisdiction.62  
The Declaration assumed a status of universal truth. It is made for everyone 
everywhere. All humans are part of this Declaration. But the logic of this universal 
vision falls short. Certain people constructed and adopted it. It is a product of a 
committee and a vote. It is not universally inclusive as it claims. The world is more 
plural than the 48 States that voted on this Declaration, or the 18 representatives who 
negotiated it; or the one man who drafted it. In finitude, there are a lot of different 
identities that did not take part of this Declaration.  
 
In finitude, there is no true universal realm to embody. The Declaration assumes it 
embodies a true universal. But that space does not exist. It assumes that it can 
                                     
60 Linda M.G. Zerilli, The Universalism Which Is Not One, Diacritics, Vol. 28.2, 1998, at 19. 
61 Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Notre Dame L. Rev., 1998, at 1153. 
62 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Preamble.  
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represent all the plural identities of the world in one document. But that cannot 
happen. A lot of values are left out of what the Declaration dictates.The Declaration 
represents the universal function. It acts as if it is universal. It convinces everyone it is 
universal. It believes everyone should adopt it. 
 
What is holding this version of universality is a power structure, as I will argue in this 
part. The continuing political hegemony of the values that went into the Declaration 
guarantees that the Declaration continues as the representation of the universal 
function. 
 
But power can be taken away from the values that the Declaration stands for. The 
representation of the universal function becomes contingent. Any competing values 
can prove that the Declaration is a product of those who constructed it. The 
occupation of the universal function does not mean that the Declaration is universal. It 
means the Declaration is powerful enough to dominate over other emancipatory 
languages. The universal function becomes important for different identities to 
compete for its representation.  
 
Thus, the universal function is the role in which dominant identities can claim 
universality but without betraying their particular values. It is the role that they play to 
maintain their universal claims through power. They act as if they are universal but 
anyone can disprove their particularity.  
 
However, any claim to displace the representative of the universal function needs to 
defer to the universal as an empty ground. An empty universal is the realm, which 
proves that any representation of the universal function is contingent. We retain the 
empty universal to make sure that we can always strive for new dominations.63  
 
All identities become equal in their particularity because they lack the empty 
universal. They are all values that matter and exist.  
 
                                     
63 Gillian Rose, MOURNING BECOMES THE LAW, 1996. 
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A. The Realm of hope 
 
Through history, the relationship between the universal and the particular identities 
commenced in terms of opposites.64 The two realms contrast each other. So both 
realms do not interact: “the particular can only corrupt the universal.”65 There has to 
be choice between both. 
 
There was a dividing line between the content of the universal and the content of the 
particular: “Either the particular realizes in itself the universal- that is it eliminates 
itself as particular and transforms itself in a transparent medium through which 
universality operates- or it negates the universal by asserting its particularism.”66 The 
particular either becomes the universal or it embraces its particularity. It cannot be 
both a particular identity and a universal one. 
 
But, the line dividing between the universal and particular cannot belong to either the 
universal or the particular realm. We cannot contrast both realms on a ground that 
belongs to either of the two realms. The dividing line cannot be particular because the 
particular becomes part of the universal erasing the dividing line. It becomes the 
definition of the universal. Also, the line cannot be universal because the particular 
becomes part of the universal. It erases the particular identity. Laclau argues: 
 
The very possibility of formulating this last 
question [on the dividing line between universal 
and particular] would require that the form of 
universality as such is subjected to a clear 
differentiation from the actual contents to which it 
is associated. The thought of this difference, 
however, is not available to ancient philosophy.67  
 
                                     
64 Ernesto Laclau, EMANCIPATIONS, 1996, at 22. 
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67 Id.  
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In order for the two realms to differ, they must contrast and interact at the same time. 
Both realms need to mediate. In Secularity, we need a relation between the universal 
and particular identities that does not make it about a choice between them. 68  
  
In religion in contrast, the universal is the realm of God. It is a realm that does not 
overlap with the finite human world: it is outside of it. There is no need for a relation 
between both realms. So the universal is a realm that does not have any presence of 
the particularity. It is pure: true. 
 
In religion, the “logic of incarnation” mediates between the universal and the finite 
pluralistic world.69 Revelation incarnates the universal within the finite world. It 
transforms the universal into a space that humans comprehend. That incarnation 
marks the line between the finite world and what is beyond existence.70 God is the 
mediator between both realms through revelation.  
 
Thus, humans do not access God’s universal through reason.71 They do not control the 
mediation. The mediation is not a rational one and does not have to be, as it does not 
come from the human world.  
 
But with the negation of God as a source of truth and all existence, the universal starts 
to emanate from finite pluralistic humans. Finite pluralism is the realm of human 
existence. It is all the different particular identities that need to mediate or struggle 
with each other.  
 
The universal is no longer exclusive to God in secularism. Humans no longer need 
revelation to access universality. They access it themselves. Hence, the universal 
shares the same space of the plurality:  
 
For prejudice, superstition, subjective whim, 
illegitimate authorities, received tradition and 
                                     
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 13. 
70 Id. at 22-24. 
71 Id. at 22-24. 
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revealed religion, reason substitutes the 
disinterested truth and the objective criterion of 
judgment, grounded on independence on the 
resolution and courage to use one’s own reason.72  
 
Within the Enlightenment tradition, reason embodies the universal. The universal 
found a particular body to embody it through reason, the replacement of God. Reason 
became the new mediator between universality and particularity. It made the totality 
seem reachable. 
 
Reason made everyone subject to its universality. The European secular individual 
became in control of creating the world and had to protect that world against anyone 
who opposes it.73 European values became a civilizing mission, subordinating other 
values.  
 
Any opposition to the established universal becomes irrational. Whatever identity 
realizes its claims to universality becomes the privileged self.  
 
European values internalized the subordination of other ‘irrational’ values to disguise 
its own particularity. They normalized their supremacy and their subordination. 
“Relativism of authority does not establish the authority of relativism: it opens reason 
to new claimants.”74 So any claim against particularity of European values becomes 
not about the values but about who utilizes them.  
 
Thus, reason defers its particularity towards the subjectivity of the user. On that note 
Laclau asserts, 
 
In the case of a secular eschatology… as the source of the universal 
is not external but internal to the world, the universal can only 
manifest itself through the establishment of an essential inequality 
between the objective positions of the social agents. Some of them 
are going to be privileged agents of historical change, not as a result 
                                     
72Gillian Rose, LOVE’S WORK, New York Review Books Classics, 1995 at 123. 
73 Laclau, supra note 64, at 122-123. 
74 Rose, supra note 72, at 124. 
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of a contingent relation of forces but because they are incarnations 
of the universal. 75 
 
This happened, as the universalized reason did not differentiate between God’s 
universalism and universalism that emanates from within finite plurality. For Laclau, 
“the universal had found its own body, but this was still the body of a certain 
particularity- European culture of the nineteenth century.” Reason did not differentiate 
between representing the universal function and its particular identity.76  
 
Thus, reason embodies the universal it does not represent it through that logic. It 
cancelled the distinction between the universal realm and the particular realm.77  
 
But this universal can never be true as it comes from within finitude. A certain 
particular dominates the function of the universal, while spreading its content as 
universal. 
 
Thus, I differentiate between the universal function that human rights, through sharing 
the logic of reason, represent and human rights as a particular identity. Human rights’ 
particular identity exists within the finite pluralism. So a concrete universal cannot 
exist.  
 
The dichotomy between true and false universal does not exist since in finitude 
plurality cannot be taken away. We cannot reach a true universal if we only speak of 
finitude.  
 
Human rights only represent the universal function; it does not embody a true 
universal. Human rights act as a God who is human: asserting its domination over and 
from within humanity’s pluralism. 
 
                                     
75 Laclau, supra note 64, at 25 
76 Id. at 24. 
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The universal function is the role the human rights movement acquired when it 
claimed universality. It acquired a totalizing role with its devotions. Struggles had to 
be addressed in forms of rights.  
 
Differentiating between the universal function and the particularity of human rights 
creates a universal that can incarnate through different bodies. The universal function 
is open for all identities and not just human rights. Any identity can acquire the role of 
representing the universal function. The universal function is a realm of hope for 
domination over other particulars.  
 
But, the universal function, now represented by human rights, is a contingent realm. It 
is contingent because claims against its representation are logical. Claims can contest 
the domination of human rights over the representation of the universal function. 
 
Accordingly, to represent the universal function, competing identities have to fight for 
it, as I will argue in the next section.  
 
B. Contingency in Hope 
 
Any particular representing the universal function is always going to be contingent. 
The differences between identities shape the contingency of the representation of the 
universal function. Thus, any claim to universality will be met with, and limited by, 
other claims to universality: 
 
(T)he tension and ambiguities surrounding all these so-called 
'universal' principles: all of them have to be formulated as 
limitless principles, expressing a universality transcending them: 
but they all, for essential reasons, sooner or later become 
entangled in their own contextual particularism and are 
incapable of fulfilling their universal function.78 
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Identities embrace and work with the power struggles to represent the universal 
function. They fight over the universal function. They compete for their values to 
dominate.  
 
Hence, power shapes the results of the contingency of representing the universal 
function. The contingency is stabilized by supremacy of certain identities in a terrain 
of politics. 
 
So, human rights discourse has to deny its particular identity to acquire that 
supremacy.79 It represents itself as a universal forgetting its own particularity. It has to 
forget its particularity in order to fulfill the functions of universal representation: to 
claim power, to resonate above and at the same time be utilized by the politics/ states/ 
corporates/ individuals/ subalterns.  
 
The discourse’s particularity is only apparent to other particulars. Once the movement 
claims the universal function it also has faith in its universality. It believes in its 
representation.  
 
But human rights discourse does not ‘reason’80 its universality. Human rights 
movement has a passion to faith in its universality to fulfill the universal function. 
The passion to faith entails the believer to experience her belief by herself. She throws 
herself into her beliefs with all she has, not thinking it through. 81 Human rights 
activists have to believe they are doing good to sell it to the non-believers. They have 
to justify their devotions, as I mentioned in part one.    
 
So human rights force their representation of the universal function: 
 
It is not a matter of weighing each particular claim to the 
universal against some transcultural or transhistorical universal, 
or of deciding which claim will be authorized as the “true 
                                     
79Id. at 54. 
80 That must be shocking?! 
81 Kierkegaard contrasted the passion to faith with the reflection on faith. The reflection on faith is about 
intellectual articulation, which can be taught by others and does not have to be felt like passion, in: Soren 
Kierkegaard, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS, 1846, at 26-28. 
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universal” according to some preexisting normative, ethical, or 
cognitive criteria. It is a matter, rather, of mediating the relation 
between the particular and the universal in a public space, with 
every mediation remaining open for further mediations.82 
 
Power becomes the way to force the content of human rights on everyone. It forces its 
domination over other languages of emancipation. 
 
Hence, the human rights movement does not abstract or abandon its particularity 
once it fills the universal function. It acquires power. It cannot take away the 
particularity of development and economic growth when it assimilates to them. It just 
spreads their flawed promises around.  
 
So, fighting over the representation of the universal function is in the name of 
domination. It cannot be justified in the name of humanity or any transcendental 
justice. Claiming the universal function becomes a source for power domination. 
 
But we cannot exist in a state of pure differentiation and abandon the universal 
function. The state of pure differentiation,83 or finitude pluralism as I referred to 
earlier, means that all identities claim that their particularities are the essence of 
existence. Western values become the definition of humanity and other values 
become savagery.    
 
In pure differentiation, the ontological differences between identities cannot be 
experienced by each other. Identities do not understand realities similarly. They 
become enemies to one another. So when they come together it is always a violent 
clash:  
 
We would only have either a complementarity of 
differences which would be totally neo-
antagonistic, or a totally antagonistic one, one 
where differences entirely lack any 
commensurability, and whose only possible 
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resolution is the mutual destruction of the 
adversaries.84 
 
Different identities would fight the identity of human rights and not fight the 
domination of the human rights discourse. So they do not reject human rights’ 
domination but the identity itself: 
 
When attention is focused at the beginning of a work on discrediting 
the System, its historicism, its closure etc., in the name of existential 
‘freedom’ or the released ‘other’, this, in effect, proudly obsoletes 
‘freedom and otherness- political or existential. Such apparent house-
clearing amounts to a recollection which is itself a refusal, an 
unreadiness, for anxiety. It awards itself a certainty while claiming to 
breed no certainties.85 
 
Rose warns if the rights discourse were rejected completely, we would create new 
concrete universals in the name of the other. We create new definitions of humanity 
that claim to be the only existing one to fight the human of human rights.  
 
Consequently, identities with power will always be powerful and the undermined 
identities will always be alien.86 They all become stuck where they are, in the chain of 
power. The new definitions of humanity do not have access to the power of human 
rights. They cannot claim the human of human rights is just a possibility of the shape 
of humanity. 
 
We need to keep the contingency of the universal function in order to fight illusions 
of human rights movement that I mentioned in first part, or any new illusions. We 
need it to reject the status of the hegemonic: 
 
To destroy philosophy, to abolish or to supersede critical, self-
conscious reason, would leave us resourceless to know the difference 
between fantasy and actuality, to discern the distortion between ideas 
and their realization.87 
 
                                     
84 Id. at 61. 
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The realm of hope is important for its contingency. For Rose, the aporetic universal, 
or the universal function as I refer to it, is a space that rejects the abstraction of rights 
(their true universal space) and embraces the rights discourse as a space for 
recognition of all other particulars lacking in the discourse.  
 
The universal function keeps the struggles between identities, as a necessity to 
represent it. It gives access points to new versions of humanity to claim that the 
human of human rights is just a possibility. In speaking of differences and power 
struggles, the universal function must always be present.  
 
Moreover, it is impossible to stay in a pure differential state when identities deal with 
one another. Each difference hinders all other differences: “On the one side, the 
externality of otherness is within the something’s own inwardness; on the other side, 
it remains as otherness distinguished from it; it is still externality as such, but in the 
something.”88 Identities destabilize and oppress each other, when they interact.  
 
For example, human rights discourse would differentiate itself from within other 
emancipation discourses. So when the discourse juxtaposes itself to all other 
identities, it asserts at the same time all other identities. 89 They are part of its 
particular identity. Human rights discourse would dominate over other emancipation 
discourses and embrace them all when it contacts them. Identities become asserted 
and destroyed through their particularities. 
 
A universal ground is important to constitute the identity of human rights as a full 
particular different from all other particulars. A ground that pre-exists the differences 
is essential to establish all particulars fully.90 Thus, identities differ from a ground that 
is not particular but more than that. On this note, Hegel articulates existence as not 
only a determination from all other identities but also an instantiation of the 
universal.91 “The assertion of one's own particularity requires the appeal of something 
                                     
88 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, SCIENCES OF LOGIC, 1871, at 103. 
89 Laclau, supra note 64, at 49. 
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transcending it.”92 The plurality of finitude needs the universal to establish the 
particular identities by differing to that realm.  
 
Nevertheless, the universal function cannot exist without that appeal to being 
different. When a particular differentiates itself from another it does so by appealing 
to a universal ground. The particular exist as part of “a complex and elaborated 
system of relations with other groups,”93 mediated through power struggles.  
 
Thus, the universal function is a place of struggles between identities. 94 There are no 
true agreements between identities that are different. The representation of the 
universal function is a sign of power. It is not a sign of acquiescence between all 
particulars, as “acquiescence is, of course, the hallmark of hegemony”95:  
 
There is nothing that we all share by virtue of being human or 
of living in a particular community that guarantees a common 
view of the world; there is nothing extralinguistic in the world 
that guarantees that we all share a common experience; there is 
no Archimedean place from which we could accede to a 
universal standpoint.96 
 
Similarly, Rose does not reconcile the differences between particulars. She preaches 
towards viewing the fullness in the contradictions and suffering in the world.97 She 
engages with the power struggles between identities. She articulates a way to deal 
with the suffering under domination that does not tell us that our struggles are not 
important.98  
 
Firstly, she asks us to “mourn” the lost promises of the dominating identities and 
engage in a critical reflection of their promises.99 Mourning requires constant 
criticism of what rights offer and deny us and to see their actuality around us: 
“Mourning draws on transcendent but representable justice, which makes the 
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suffering of immediate experience visible and speakable.”100 So we do not romanticize 
them but engage critically with what they do. Struggles should be out in the open and 
not hidden or forbidden just because we have ‘rights’. 
 
Thus, mourning results from failures of post-modernity. Postmodernity failed because 
it misplaced mourning in the lack of rights or laws. It is fixated on the losses without 
mourning those struggles. Rose frames the failures of postmodernity mistakenly 
around an assumed search for uncontaminated ethics. Nevertheless, her version of 
mourning is what interests me.  
 
In Rose’s example of Phocion’s wife, the political actions taken by the wife are an 
example of enduring mourning. 101 Phocion was a noble statesperson, who was 
executed for treason. His burial was forbidden in Athens. So, his wife with her servant 
took his aches and consumed them burying him within her body.102 She undid the 
disgrace that was done to her husband by mourning him through her own political 
actions. Thus, she did not succumb to the powerful orders of not burying him in 
Athens. She did not give in to hatred for the tyrants. She mourned regardless of the 
orders unfolding new tragedies to be mourned.  
 
Phocion’s wife actions are not an opposition of love to political corruption. It is an 
action on its own; to be understood as it stands as a political action. Her actions 
display the necessary, willful, entanglement of/in politics. She does not gain anything 
from it but dealing with her struggles. 
 
Mourning cannot be taken away. Phocion’s wife mourns because she is human and 
laws do not take that away. So the choice was actually whether she mourns “within or 
without the law.”103  
 
But if Phocion’s wife abrogated mourning, she would be “exposed to the unmitigated 
power of the state.”104 She would be vengeful. It reminds me of the reaction that the 
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world had after the November 2015 Paris attacks. The French authorities did not 
mourn the losses. They flaunted their powers. They had to blame someone to revenge. 
No one addressed why the events happened because it would mean that the French 
authorities are to be blamed for their foreign policies. So the authorities opposed what 
happened to but for political gain not to work through the incidents. Butler addressed 
the same issue in the context of 9/11 attacks.105  
 
Butler explains that the 9/11 attacks were ethically bad but logical at the same time.106 
September 11 was a perfect rational response to the United States’ foreign policy.107 
By suspending the ethics, we can eventually analyze why it happened regardless of 
the nature of the event. But, to critically analyze September 11 would be read as 
trying to find excuses for the perpetrators.108 September 11 is framed as an 
exceptional event that was not seen before that needs to be condemned. 109 
 
The US could have mourned the losses as serious deaths, not as an attack on its 
national security. It could have grieved them as individual human beings accepting 
that we are all humans who suffer and die.110  
 
But what the US did was increase the suffrage and pain not accepting the human 
vulnerability to others creating deaths that are not grievable.111 The US refuses the 
pain: the mourning. It refuses to come face to face with itself, moving away from 
human vulnerability, marking that vulnerability as abnormal though it is part of life. It 
channels that pain into rage and revenge. The US publically grieved with anger and 
pride, like the winners of war who publically grieve the few losses but secretly 
celebrate the grand win.112 It should have engaged with the reality it created leading to 
those losses, instead of creating an endless war on terror. 
 
                                                                                                       
104 Rose, supra note 63, at 21. 
105 Judith Butler, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE, 2004. 
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109 Id. at 6. 
110 Id. at 19-21. 
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Thus, mourning cannot be escaped to move on to the next step. Lose is an opportunity 
to grow, to change as we come face to face with ourselves. So if we accept that 
possibility of growth, we accept the pain. Accepting the consequences of the US 
actions that led to 9/11 is enduring mourning.  
 
Secondly, after mourning we find a way towards influencing political struggles. Once 
we complete the task of mourning, our struggles formulate around how to engage 
with the dominant identities. Different emancipation movements have to engage with 
human rights movement when it shows it failed in delivering what it promised:  
 
When completed, mourning returns the soul to the city, renewed 
and reinvigorated for participation, ready to take on difficulties and 
injustices of the existing city. The mourner returns to negotiate and 
challenge the changing inner and outer boundaries of the soul and 
of the city; she returns to their perennial anxiety.113 
 
Enduring mourning means we influence the political, to gain power but not assimilate 
to the dominant particular. So, we strive to and fight for a better representation of the 
universal function. 
 
Though, enduring mourning creates new reasons to mourn. In political actions, 
mourning prevails because new representations of the universal function will fail to 
deliver for everyone.114 But we need to strive for what is to come, a future of this 
constructed present, which is both better and worse. It is worse because there will be a 
new subordinated group. But it is would be a new form of subordination. 
 
But, there must be a ground that disproves the fullness of the representation of 
universal function. Any claim against the politics that brings an identity to the 
universal function has to rely on the emptiness of the universal signification: “The 
aporia or gap is the Janus-face of the universal.”115 I proceed towards this 
predicament.  
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C. The Struggle to the Empty   
 
For Laclau, the human rights movement becomes the empty signifier of the universal 
function. An empty signifier denotes to no present object but to the lack of it.116 The 
object that lacks is a universal form of acquiescence between all identities.  
 
But in Laclau’s empty signifier, there is no ground to defer the emptiness of 
signification to. An empty signifier is a powerful concept (like justice) that lacks 
content or has an unstable definition. It signifies the absence of its content. But it is 
powerful because it lacks content (a signified). Laclau does not tell us how to 
differentiate between the emptiness of the signification (the lack of the universal) and 
the fullness of the signification (the universal claim of human rights through 
representing the universal function).  
 
In his empty signifier, the universal is both empty and filled: 
 
The universal is certainly empty, and can only be 
filled in different contexts by concrete particulars. 
But, at the same time, it is absolutely essential for 
any kind of political interaction, for if the latter 
took place without universal reference, there would 
be no political interaction at all.117 
 
However, filling up the universal negates its emptiness. If human rights currently 
dominate the universal function, how can we prove that it is actually a contingent 
domination?  
 
Thus, I differentiate between the emptiness of the ground and the fullness of the 
universal function. The empty universal shows that the domination of human rights 
movement is an act of violence against other identities. Human rights do not fill up 
the empty universal but they represent the universal function.  
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The empty universal makes human rights’ authority contingent. It asserts the 
contingency of the universal function. The human rights movement exercises its 
prejudices with the authority of the universal function. These prejudices are both just 
and unjust. The prejudices rest on “mystical foundations,”118 since they do not have 
their own space, as I argued in part one. They are political. We use human rights “not 
because they are just but because they have authority.”119  
 
Likewise, Pahuja moves to the universal as an empty space, with her critical belief in 
human rights discourse. She wants to keep the universal empty so values that fill the 
universal function are never fully universal. 
 
The empty universal is thus a new promise of justice, one that means that all 
differences matter. Derrida’s “deconstruction is justice” 120 shapes a new kind of 
justice, a plural contingent one. He introduces deconstruction as a path to follow for 
embracing all uncertainties towards a promise of justice that is to come but we can 
never reach.121 It is a new deferred promise; a promise that changes its content (unlike 
the one development offers with economic growth). Plurality, which is inescapable, is 
celebrated in striving towards the empty universal. Once we deconstruct the 
unquestionably full universal, the contingency of the human rights movement is 
revealed.122  
 
Though Rose critiques poststructuralists’ justice, specifically Derrida’s, I choose to 
combine their work. I do not reconcile them. Their arguments are irreconcilable as a 
whole. Rose opposes Derrida’s deconstruction, for it offers an endless mourning 
process with no where to go: 
 
Yet, by disqualifying universal notions of justice, 
freedom and the good, for being inveterately 
                                     
118 I would citric Derrida for promising too much with the uncertainties that deconstruction offers (it doesn't 
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‘metaphysical’, for colonizing and suppressing 
their others with the violence consequent on the 
chimera of correspondence, ‘post-modernism’ has 
no imagination for its own implied ground in 
justice, freedom and the good.123 
 
I reject Rose's critique of Derrida because the contingency that Derrida offers is the 
widest space to introduce the ideas that do not fit in the current representation of the 
universal function. I utilize them as a step towards those new ideas of. More 
importantly, Rose and Derrida share the same production of knowledge. They have 
echoes of the West speaking to those who suffer. I take the bits that I can speak 
through. Thus I focus on their complementary sides rather than their contradictions. 
Resolving their squabble is unnecessary for my purpose, since their work is structured 
around the same idea of knowledge that they critique.  
 
The human rights movement differs its representation of the universal function from 
other particular emancipation movements, which by turn defers to the empty 
universal. This is the concept of differance.124 Derrida defies the certainties of 
signification in structuralism with it. It is an essential concept for deconstruction. 
Differance is not only accessing the infinite possibilities that a word can denote 
through differentiating it to its opposite (here representation of universal function v. 
particularity of human rights movement). But also, it is deferring their opposition to 
each other so they are dependent on one another125 (introducing the third realm: the 
empty universal to defer the fullness of the universal function to an emptiness). It is 
hard to articulate the definition of differance without embracing the wholeness of the 
differed/deferred that is why Derrida introduces the concept of trace.126  
 
The concept of trace is the invisible path that allows differance to work.127 Pahuja 
shapes that path in the critical instability of human rights discourse (when its shows 
its particularity though it represents the universal function) that I have discussed in 
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part one.128 It is an invisible trace that only shows its logic for us to work with. The 
particularity of human rights movement is traced through the empty universal and 
through the universal function. What is traced is not their opposition to each other but 
their incompatibilities interacting with each other.129 When the path of trace does 
show its logic, it effaces itself. For we only see the particular in the universal function 
(the liberating side of the critical instability) but we know that the particular lack the 
empty universal (we see the imperial side of the critical instability). 
 
The empty universal is a ground that is not present. Its absence represents the 
possibility and impossibility of its representation.130 The possibility of representation 
is the lack of the universal within all particulars. It is the lack of the justice of 
embracing the uncertainties of deconstruction.131 Hence, any particular can be the 
representation of the universal function (of the contingent promise of justice). The 
impossibility of representation resides in the universal, as an empty realm. The justice 
is always “to come;” never present. 132 The empty universal becomes the signifier for 
the absence of the universal. Thus, the contingency of the momentary 
content/conquering of the universal function resides in offering possible grounds for 
critiquing the present representation of it. 
 
Accordingly, particular identities strive to what they lack. The empty universal in this 
relationship is important precisely for its impossibility through its lack: through 
representing the universal function: 
(T)he impossibility of a universal ground does not eliminate its 
need: it just transforms the ground into an empty place which can 
be partially filled in a variety of ways (the strategies of this filling 
is what politics is about). 133 
Human rights discourse becomes a representation of what we lack. The experience of 
not having rights becomes a signification for the objects of the interests that the 
oppressed lack in society. So the language of rights becomes about those who struggle 
in the logic of the empty universal. 
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To retain diversity in power struggles, we accept the ‘impossible but necessary’134 
paradox.135 We cannot resolve this paradox because its solution would mean that we 
had found a true body to become the universal in finitude. 
Accordingly, the empty universal equates all particulars together through its own 
necessary absence; their shared lack(ing). This is possible either by making all 
particulars equally important in their demands or by making one particular represent 
the universal function.136 The choice between both is quite political.  
Current social structures choose to compete for the representation of the universal 
function. So, the philosophical enquiry of the relation between universal and 
particular shifts to the political realm:137  
In a society (and this is finally the case of any society) in which its 
fullness - the moment of its universality - is unachievable, the 
relation between the universal and the particular is a hegemonic 
relation.138  
As human rights discourse occupies the representation of the universal function, the 
discourse cannot escape its homogenizing role. The discourse is only a representation 
of the missing totality of the empty universal. Thus, it starts to totalize everything to 
fit into its particularity.139 It cannot escape that role.  
 
But it becomes easy to build new realties to face the totalizing role of human rights 
discourse when we retain the contingency that comes with the emptiness of the 
universal.140 The presence of the contingency prevents human rights discourse from 
being fully totalizing.141 The empty universal entails the disruption of totality by 
elevating the struggles between particulars.  
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The empty universal becomes a space for agonism or “new antagonism”.142 It is 
antagonistic because the plurality of identities prevents each identity’s totality (the 
negative aspect of antagonism). 143 The positivity comes from the lack in all identities, 
which makes them all equal in their lack.144 The antagonism disrupts the differences 
between the identities by showing that they all lack totality. I highlighted this lack in 
the previous section, as it is integral to keep the contingency in the momentary 
representation of the universal function. All identities are in flux not because of their 
differences but because what they all lack. The antagonism is new because it is not a 
negative opposition of identities, rather a positive one. So in the struggle towards the 
empty universal, the identities do not fight one another as “enemies” but fight with 
each other. 145  
 
Thus, the empty universal is a place of struggles, which do not have predictable 
outcomes. It celebrates all differences not for being contradictory but for being 
equally lacking in their totality. So when the role of representing the universal 
function is challenged, it is opposed on the basis of that lack. What is challenged is 
the role the rights discourse plays when it represents the universal function. 
 
In this relation between the universal and particular, human rights discourse embraces 
its critical representation of the universal function. Striving towards an empty 
universal means human rights discourse dominates over, and at the same time stands 
for, finitude plurality.  
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In standing for plurality, human rights abandon its particularity to become a language 
of struggles. It favors its emancipatory side as discussed in part one. It no longer 
expects the coopted influence of international institutions like the WTO or on the 
market economy. It becomes excluded: a language of the Other that mourns within 
the political.  
 
But the Other are not limited to the human rights movement to express their struggles. 
They can fight its domination from within its emancipatory side or from outside. The 
empty universal makes that possible. They can fight to represent the universal 
function, as I will argue in the final part.  
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IV. Struggles within the Other 
 
In Upper Egypt, there is a form of folkloric songs, referred to as ‘mat and cover’.146 
The name symbolizes talking about your struggles openly, spreading them around, 
like how you spread a mat. Then you heal, covering them.   
 
The singers reply back and forth to each other with lyrics they form impromptu in 
short sentences. They sing through a rhythmic tone accompanied by the tunes of a 
hand drum.  
 
They sing about daily life struggle and give their insight of the way to deal with the 
struggles. Those insights are learned from experiences, traditions, and reality. For 
example, they sing:  
 
The Free loses, when time demeans from his humanity, 
So he forcefully resorts to the vile, hurting himself. 
He mourns and laments to move on, 
Asking God to ease what comes 
If fate throws any new struggles, 
So he gives to the poor from what he has, rising above the vile. 
O child, there is shame in the vile 
That your high status does not take away, 
I am telling you the truth, 
Brother let the vile be and forget them, 
Like time forgot you.147 
 
They sing of how they resolve their struggles. When there are harsh times, they reflect 
on their actions within their beliefs. They have their language of struggles. The have a 
language for their Otherness. 
 
The Other are not just the folkloric singers in Upper Egypt. Inside the category of the 
Other, there are different identities.  Those people are one identity within the Other, 
who struggle against dominations of the West. 
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The homogenization of the Other means that the elites will be representing those 
folkloric singers in Egypt. But, the singers are not the elites in Egypt, who mingle in 
the intellectual community. They both struggle differently. They have different 
realities.  
 
Thus the folkloric singers are the subaltern. Their fights are low-key. They speak to a 
small audience and influence only a small fraction of Egypt. They do not engage with 
the intellectuals frequently, but might influence them when their struggles are 
essentialized and brought to light, like they influenced me.  
 
My war with human rights discourse relates to allowing those people to influence 
their lives when they encounter the hegemonic. When they clash with the human 
rights movement they fall prey to its imperial side. Their songs do not have the same 
influence as the human rights discourse.  
 
If they could utilize the emancipating side of the language of right, they would have a 
better chance of influencing the political order. They might become recognized 
 
However, they lose their free territory of struggle. They lose their songs. They fight 
from within the human rights discourse.  
 
To maintain their freedom, they fight against the domination of human rights 
discourse. They battle to become the new universal function. So they fight from 
outside the movement. I urge them to continue singing.  
 
A. The Plurality in the Other 
 
“O my body, make of me always 
a man who questions!”148  
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The world is not about the West and the Rest. The Rest are more plural than the 
frames they are put in. The Rest here references to all Non-West. They are the Other, 
the subject of Western domination. The Other are the object of judgments. The Other 
are the people who want to be more developed like the West. They are also the ones 
who want to reject Western values. They are living under oppression. The Other here 
include those whose oppression is not heard. 
 
The Other are plural in their identities and their interests. They do not exist as a stable 
identity. They are not a coherent homogenous category but a plural one. 
 
In defining the Other as a homogenous category, the identities that constitute the 
Other become signified by the most powerful voice within the category. Crenshaw 
frames that as the downside of the “embrace of identity politics.”149 The downside is 
“not that it fails to transcend difference…but rather the opposite- that it frequently 
conflates or ignores intra group differences.”150 The plurality within the Other is 
obliterated.  
 
This hinders the identities that do not speak loudly enough. For example, battered 
women are recognized in the form of white women not women of color. So when the 
battered women are recognized as a collective/coherent identity, the “identity- based 
politics” become what speaks of that violence.  
 
The white women are the ones who speak. The identity-based politics is the dominant 
identity that shapes the identity of all abused women. So this identity speaks about 
white women who face violence, but when the women are of color, the violence 
against them gets ignored, because it is relocated elsewhere in another dimensions, 
like racism.  
 
Thus, Crenshaw suggests that the categorization of battered women is socially 
constructed around white women. The women of color are the Otherness in the 
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homogenous Other. She highlights the subordination of women of color in that 
categorization.151 
 
The dominant identity ignores other dimensions, like class, race, gender and many 
more, to shape violence around the identity politics of a few.152 Thus, the abuse 
against women of color gets shifted to the domain of racism that deals with the 
environment. Being colored means instantly that your abuse is normal in your 
environment, so it is more about the environment than the violence against you. 
 
The omission of those dimensions of abuse mutes and ignores the different factors 
that shape violent experiences for women. It is not only about the violence the women 
are subjected to. But also it is about the prejudices against them and their social status. 
Violence against women of color is not constructed the same way as the abuse white 
women are subject to. They are both constructed differently and need different 
approaches to tackle them.  
 
It gets worse for the women of color if they are poor and unemployed. Social status 
intersects with the experience of the abused women of color. But when it is 
highlighted, social status becomes the issue to the abuse. Intersectionality denotes to 
the interaction between different dimensions of the experience of women of color in 
regards to their abuse.  
 
Crenshaw wants to re-conceptualize the identity of battered women. “The identity of 
the group” cannot be “centered on intersectional identities of a few”, for “strategies 
(to fight violence against women) based solely on the experiences of women who do 
not share the same class or race backgrounds will be of limited utility for those whose 
lives are shaped by a different set of obstacles.”153  
 
Crenshaw problematizes the consequences of the categorization of race and gender 
problems around white women, for the women of color. There are two levels of 
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subordination for women of color. One, when the categories are formed around white 
women’s experience. The other, when those categories have social consequences that 
affect not only white women but women of color.  
 
Women of color need interventions that reflect their experience with violence not the 
experience of a homogenous category. Crenshaw wants to find a way for the women 
of color to “find expression” in the already constructed identity politics.  
 
Likewise, Abu Lughod attacks the authority that Western views speak with on how 
Muslim women live.154 She contends, “Projects of saving other women depend on and 
reinforce a sense of superiority by Westerners, a form of arrogance that deserves to be 
challenged.”155 Westerns assume they can comprehend what Muslim women demand: 
Muslim women need to be liberated from wearing burqa that Taliban regime is 
forcing on them.156  But Abu Lughod introduces burqa outside the Taliban regime, as 
an ethnic representation of modesty.157 Burqa is not a Taliban invention but traditional 
clothing.158  
 
Thus, she links forms of savior missions to masked colonialism. To say that Muslim 
women should be saved from wearing the burqa is to force a lifestyle on them. 
 
Abu Lughod wants recognition of different forms of living as justice.159 She rejects 
the homogenizing view of what is harmful and what is not. The choices of Muslim 
women ought to be respected not rejected as harmful. The recognition of those 
choices is an acceptance of their significance. Consequently, the Westerners must 
abandon their authority in dictating what Muslim women need. 
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That will not happen unless we acknowledge the plurality of the Other’s voices. To 
take in the plurality of experiences of violence means to address them differently with 
no sets of prejudices that speak of some experiences over the other. 
 
On this matter, Spivak critiques the assumption that the ‘homogenized’ Other (the 
battered women) is accessible through their unified interests and desires, in post-
structuralism.160 She argues against the equation between all interests, all desires, and 
all power struggles in one understanding of the Other. She negates the desire to 
understand “society’s Other” as a coherent identity within the plurality of relations. 161 
So, she asserts the plurality of the relationships between powers, interests and desires 
(the plurality of experiences of battered women). She retains the plurality of power 
relations just like Crenshaw wants to retain the plurality of experiences of battered 
women.  
 
In addressing power as a totality, we can lose sight of who is in power: “The plural 
but total way of conceiving power leaves the individual more not less exposed to the 
unmitigated power of the state.”162 When everything is seen as part of power 
relations, it becomes quite hard to locate power and revert it; is it white men, colored 
men, or white women that we need to address? But the oppressed are always easy to 
locate. They are the subjects of domination: the women of color. I am interested in 
Spivak’s critique of poststructuralists to give an alternative (her essentialization of the 
subaltern) to the drastic suggestion that I choose in the final section of my 
dissertation. 
 
It is like the idea that different sets of rights mean different things in different 
contexts. The dogmatic understanding of what democracy entails, consists of 
transparent elections, political parties, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, a 
system of checks and balances… But for certain groups it has a different connotation. 
For example, democracy for Ghanaian women means predictable outcomes from the 
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authorities of their country.163 The women cross borders frequently to get products for 
businesses to support their families. The right to democracy for them means better 
institutions that do not encourage bribes to get things done. It means a guarantee for 
their safety while crossing borders.  
 
Ghanaian women are not represented in their idea of democracy. There is plurality in 
what the women would want as individuals. Theorizing opens up space for the 
Ghanaian women to speak when they must. The intellectual lets the Ghanaian women 
do the substance of the theory.  
 
The theorizer understands Ghanaian women can express their oppression but they are 
not heard because they lack power, for poststructuralists.164 So the theorizer becomes 
their voice. The oppressed had the knowledge to speak of their oppression but lack the 
means. So the intellectual becomes the tool for the oppressed to shift the relations of 
force, not the representation of the oppressed. 
 
For Spivak, this is a unification of desires and interests of the theorizer and the Other 
in the name of power.165 Poststructuralists view theorizing as schematic rather than 
textual. Schematic means that theory has a function that does not change: a mean 
towards shifting power. On the other hand, textual means different theories can be 
more than means towards shifting relations. Spivak criticizes that they view the 
relationship between desires and interests as schematic. 
 
When the divisions between the desires of the oppressed and the interests of the 
intellectual in theorizing are unified within the subject of the intellectual, 
poststructuralists “restore the category of the sovereign subject within the theory that 
seems most to question it”.166 Spivak attacks the “generalized ideological subject of 
the theorist,”167 which attempts to collect heterogeneous interests in one category and 
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introduce that category to the discourse of power.168 Poststructuralists equivocate 
between subjectivity and representation. The subjectivity is the intellectual’s 
assumption of the interests of the Other. The representation is that of the intellectual 
when theorizing on the Other.  
 
The desires of the oppressed are conflated with the intellectual’s interests in 
theorizing.169 The identity of the subject is constructed of interests which gets 
dislocated in power struggles to maintain the hegemonic.170 The interests of the Other 
become assumed by the intellectual. The intellectual dislocates the interests of the 
Other towards her categorization of a coherent Other. Thus, what is actually 
happening is a dislocation in the consciousness of the Other. The plural identities get 
displaced into one consciousness that speaks as the unified oppressed, like the white 
battered women identity that speaks through the intellectual about – for – all other 
battered women.  
 
For Spivak, poststructuralists equate representation, Vertrenten, as in the political 
sense, and re-presentation, Darstellen, as in transformation of one’s identity once it 
has undergone representation.171 She deconstructs ‘representation’ and denotes that 
poststructuralists cannot ignore both sides of representation, because it makes them 
fall into the problems of re-presentation. They ignore the subjectivity of the 
intellectual once she starts theorizing because they only see her as means of projecting 
experiences of subaltern-battered-women of color. Spivak engages with both sides of 
representation so she can introduce her essentialization of the subaltern within the 
Other.  
 
Relatedly- but in contrast though for the same purpose- Rose critiques 
postmodernists’ immediate desire of representing the essentialized Other, in the 
binary opposition to the Self.172 She rejects binary oppositions. She wants to mourn 
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the failures of modernity by taking political actions as existing identities.173 She gives 
the example of the ‘ineffability’ of the Holocaust. The ‘ineffability’ is the 
uncomfortable position that we are in if we attempt to understand that the Holocaust 
is not an exception: “we fear that it may be all too understandable, all too continuous 
with what we are- human, all too human.”174 She does not want to represent what 
happened in the Holocaust but to over come the uncomfortable representation (in a 
binary opposition of victim/perpetrator- especially the uncomfortable position of a 
surviving Jew and that of the probable non-Jews perpetrators) towards understanding 
the existing identities.  
 
Understanding the Holocaust as an existing identity means engaging in an inner 
relation with the experience of the Holocaust, on an ontological level: “ Philosophy 
would abolish representation. The translation of modern metaphysics into ontology 
involves…the overcoming of representation as the imperium of the modern 
philosophical subject.”175 I understand Rose’s position as overcoming representation 
in the philosophical sense to let the surviving identities mourn rather than be deemed 
to a role (victim or perpetrator).  
 
On the other hand, Spivak utilizes post-structuralism towards the same goal of 
understanding the existing identities. Spivak introduces Derrida to decenter the 
intellectual subject that constructs the Other. She introduces the “blankness” of 
knowledge within intellectual subject, 176 to open up the Other to what the West 
cannot articulate. The blankness within the human rights discourse becomes the plural 
substance of the Other. The discourse cannot, or chooses not to, see the blankness. 
The plurality of the Other gets introduced to the movement through its lack of 
knowledge.  
 
Spivak wants to locate certain oppressions within the oppressed and essentializes 
them in power struggles within the language of rights. I propose to undo the muting of 
the silence of the subaltern in the current human rights discourse as a plausible 
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alternative to fighting outside of the discourse, in the next part. Though I reject it in 
the final section of this part.   
 
B. The Otherness in the Other 
 
There are people whose consciousness we 
cannot grasp if we close off our benevolence 
by constructing a homogenous Other referring 
only to our own place in the seat of the Same 
or Self. 
To confront them is not to represent them but 
to learn to represent ourselves. 177 
 
To fight within the human rights discourse, the subaltern struggles can be 
essentialized to have access to the hegemonic power. This strategy reduces all 
struggles to those of the subaltern which in itself become a new hegemonic, therefore 
it can be an intentional strategy to fight within the human rights discourse. 
 
The subaltern are those who are not only oppressed but are unable to access the 
hegemonic power. The hegemonic power affects them but they do not affect it in any 
significant way. For Foucault, power is present in the mundane, so subaltern do have 
a relation with the hegemonic: 
 
All these lives, which were destined to pass beneath all 
discourse and to disappear without ever being spoken, 
have only been able to leave behind traces – brief, 
incisive, and often enigmatic – at the point of their 
instantaneous contact with power.178  
 
So though they are not visible in power structures, they still exist in them. 
 
The subaltern can resist against the hegemonic. But if they resist the hegemonic, they 
die. Their deaths are meaningless, not at all heroic. Though death in itself can be seen 
as a form of resistance.  
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Subaltern do not fit in the Other who are identified by their difference or the 
possibility of assimilation179 to the West because they do not matter. They are the 
battered women of color. Their oppression is even more oppressive because it is 
unrecognized and invisible. They have no value to the oppressor; no relation that 
leverages them. There is no “object of seduction”180 to leverage the subaltern to have 
it their way, but there is an object of subordination to coerce them into the system.  
 
Spivak argues the subaltern does not have a voice in the generalized Other because 
they do not belong to it.181 The women of color do not belong to the category of 
battered women. The subalterns are not the dominant white women, so they lack the 
means that are given through being oppressed as the battered white women. The 
women of color lack significance to the society. They are the people who are 
constitutively differed from the battered white women and the intellectual’s idea of 
battered women’s experience that is based on white women’s experiences. Thus, they 
are the muted because their experiences are unacknowledged; invisible. 
 
Spivak argues that inside the oppressed, as a plural category, there is representation. 
The battered white women represent the women of color. The subaltern, or Otherness 
in the Other, is represented by the oppressed that can have the means to speak 
themselves through the intellectual theorizing about them. The subaltern identity does 
not belong to the oppressed because the oppressed participate in the relay with the 
intellectual theorizing, while the subaltern do not participate.182 
 
The subaltern can never be the signified because they do not have contact with the 
theorizer. They do not utilize the language of rights. The subaltern are not recognized 
as oppressed or recognized at all, but represented and muted by their masters: 
 
The small peasant proprietors cannot represent themselves; they 
must be represented. Their representative must appear 
simultaneously as their master, as an authority over them, as 
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unrestricted governmental power that protects them from the other 
classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above.183  
 
The subaltern peasants lack the means of their masters. They are unrepresented. 
Hence, “Representation has not withered away,”184 for there is still a 
signifier/signified. This time, the signified is the subaltern. And the signifier is the 
homogenous Other.  
 
Spivak contrasts the Indian women, as a subaltern, to the Indian elites that constitute 
the Other, in her example of codification of Hindu Law. She explains that in order for 
the British to control the population, they created an Indian self-regulating system. 
The law became a mechanism for the epistemic violence of control as the British 
created “a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in 
opinions, in morals and in intellect.” 185 The Indian elites were indoctrinated into 
Western ideologies so they can serve the functions that the British demanded: to 
control the masses.  
 
Spivak addresses the epistemic violence that the British did by codifying Hindu law. 
They prohibited sati to civilize the Indian society. She uses the example of sati ritual 
to form Indian women as subaltern. In the ritual, the widow sacrifices herself when 
her husband dies as a sign of love and loyalty.  
 
When the British came, they criminalized the sati practice because “White men are 
saving brown women from brown men.”186 White men are the saviors of the Indian 
women from savagery. The subaltern women are portrayed as the victims of that 
savagery.  
 
The muting of the subaltern Indian women is traced by contrasting the culture 
speaking for the women with the British speaking for them. In the cultural scenario, 
“the women actually wanted to die.”187 In these two scenarios, of the ritual being 
                                     
183 Id. at 276-277. 
184 Id. at 308. 
185 Id. at 282. 
186 Id. at 297. 
187 Id.  
  
 
55 
criminalized or ritual being held, women do not have accessibility to the hegemonic 
colonial power, but only are represented by it. 
 
The subaltern women are the signified of what the intellectual in these two scenarios 
dictates on her: her protection. The practice being criminalized means that the 
colonizers have spoken for the women and the practice being allowed means that 
tradition has spoken for them.  
 
No one asked the women what they wanted: “One never encounters the testimony of 
the women’s voice-consciousness.” 188 These options mystify the women’s voice: 
either “women as object of protection from her own kind”189 or sati as a “reward” for 
her faithfulness to her husband.190   
 
Those women, if asked, wouldn’t give the same answer to the question. Their answers 
would have been numerous. In my opinion, there lies the problem. The hegemonic 
would not only recognize that the subaltern women can speak of their desires, but also 
recognizes their desires as valid. It would mean that the colonizers would allow the 
sati ritual for those women who wanted it, and recognize the validity of their opinion 
as well. It would also mean, that the holders of tradition would have recognized that 
not holding the ritual does not anguish the soul of the women so their cultural 
devotion would be contingent.  
 
However, such women do not have a structure in order for them to speak for 
themselves against those who speak for them. Each is represented within the Other, 
but in this representation, she cannot benefit from the tools the Other has in 
connection to the hegemonic.  
 
So the subaltern are voiceless. The subaltern woman exists outside of the system of 
representation between the Other and the West, not because she represents herself but 
because her identity is not recognized in the system (she is not re-presented through 
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the intellectual). She is represented (in political sense) by the Indian elites. But her 
representation is also her muting. Spivak’s lament, “the subaltern cannot speak,” is 
because of the dislocation of the identity of the subaltern women within the category 
of the Other. 
 
Going back to the sati ritual, the woman’s widow status is the initiator of the practice 
and its criticism. Even when the woman disappears from the world of patriarchy, she 
is still present because she is the ground for legitimating the practice of sati itself.  
 
But that is also the “violent aporia” that the subaltern woman exists/disappears in.191 
It means that though the subaltern woman is the origin of the practice and its 
criticism, she is the non-origin of the discourses on sati.  
 
So intellectual interventions subordinate the subaltern identity when they try to 
redeem its dislocation. What the intellectual does is speak about, speak of, speak at, 
and speak for the subaltern. The intellectual ought to acknowledge her responsibility 
for theorizing. Likewise, Spivak ends by remarking, “The female intellectual as 
intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish.”192 
Thus, the subaltern emancipation is not attributed to the intellectual.  
 
Subaltern women’s dislocated identity within the Other requires recognition. To make 
her desires visible, the Other, as opposed to the hegemonic power, should be viewed 
as a signifier/signified structure. That shows they do not influence the hegemonic.  
 
So we, as intellectuals, trace the subaltern identity within the Other but then relocate it 
within the representation system inside the category of the Other. The goal is not to 
find out how the subaltern woman engages with power productively, but to see what 
happens to her voice in current chains of power so they can utilize the existent 
language of rights for their freedom. 
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The subaltern women own their own liberation when their struggles are essentialized 
within the language of rights.193 They need to acquire their own liberation; to utilize 
the rights discourse to fit their struggles.   
 
Nevertheless, I argue that the relocation of subaltern voices within the language of 
rights does not mean they are free. Hegel, in his master-slave dialectic, goes to 
assuming that the slaves have to own their liberation.194 The master is dependent on 
slavery for his wealth. So slaves cannot depend on their masters to give them their 
emancipation because that would mean the masters would give up their sources of 
wealth.  
 
Slaves have to risk it all and put their lives on the line to be truly liberated. Hegel goes 
further to saying that slaves are responsible for their slavery because they chose to 
live as slaves and not to die for freedom.195 He deems Africans in colonies to slavery. 
It is a step necessary for the realization of their own personality, as their homelands 
are quite premature.196 So in order to fully be emancipated, slaves have to take down 
slavery, as a system.197  
 
To unfold Hegel’s dialectic, his master/slave dialectic should be read in the light of 
Haitian revolution. Hegel was witnessing the revolt through his daily readings of a 
journal that spoke of it.198 His Eurocentric privileges along with witnessing of real 
action of revolting help us understand the tension in his version of freedom.  
 
For Fanon, freedom ends “the colonists’ way of thinking”;199 it destructs the 
“epistemic mastery of the master.”200 Liberation is more drastic than assuming the role 
of the master. Becoming the master represents integration into the master’s 
structure.201 Slaves need to annihilate the constructs that they live in to liberate 
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themselves.202 But once the oppressed revolt against the masters, there is no end to the 
struggles. 
 
Freedom is not the opposition of slavery. The opposition of slavery is recognition. 
Recognition is the unmuting of the silence. The slaves and subaltern women become 
unmuted within human rights discourse. But not free. Freedom entails a fight against 
the human rights discourse.  
 
C. Towards New Dominations  
 
Listen to me! For I am thus and thus. Do 
not, above all, confound me with what I 
am not! 203 
 
This part encapsulates the previous words of this dissertation towards the goal I paved 
the way for.  
 
Human rights, as a language for emancipation and a language for experts, can accept 
the plurality of voices inside of them. Those voices are capable of using rights to 
inflict change in power struggles. But though they are capable of inflicting change. 
The change never comes as drastic as it is assumed to be.  
 
Though, we can never forget about the imperial side of the human rights discourse: 
the movement itself. I referred to human rights movement as the imperial side of the 
discourse because the word movement addresses the devotions and illusions; contrary 
to the word discourse that embraces the imperial and emancipatory side at the same 
time.  
 
The essentialization of the subaltern forgets the humanity in the subaltern. The 
subaltern are “enraged and invested.”204 They are not ideal, something that Spivak 
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misses as a strategy to bring their silenced identities together into the light.205 She 
glorifies the subaltern though the subaltern are not only victims nor perpetrators but 
actors in the political struggle that lack power but strive for it. So they “may initiate a 
unilateral and fundamental change in the terms of relating without renegotiating them, 
and further, refusing even to acknowledge the change.”206  
 
They are now less powerful than the hegemonic and vulnerable to it, but they are also 
powerful in their Otherness and in their resistance to the hegemonic. They utilize 
power against each other and against the hegemonic. They subordinate even now in 
their subaltern lives. 
 
The subaltern would have their causes recognized if they were essentialized against 
the hegemonic. They will get sympathy and people may start to help them. They will 
have attention from NGOs and businesses that are looking to lessen their tax pay 
through charity. That is change. That is them not being ignored. But the subaltern still 
exist within a system of development and economic growth that inherently does not 
work for them. There is no better here, only more struggles for them. They just found 
a way to participate in the political system. 
 
I do not agree that participation in the power struggles is enough. I urge for more. I 
will not urge the West to give up the domination of their identity to make all identities 
equal in their demands from universal, because that would be a belief in a false 
contingency that the powerful would give up their powers. In the modern state 
structures, all identities have to fight for their demands to be heard. I urge for an 
escalation of the fight.  
 
Thus, I argue for the Other to be seen as a plural category with different interests and 
desires from the ones human rights discourse offers. The Other do not have to be 
more like the West. They can create discourses that fight alongside human rights 
discourse.  
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In order to truly get the drastic change to escape the imperial side, I argue that the 
Other, as a plurality, need to create discourses to fight along with and against the 
human rights discourse. There would be no need to essentialize the subaltern within 
the Other. The subaltern would exist and would be heard within the plurality of the 
Other. The Other(s), in their otherness would have each other, but in their differences 
would have themselves.  
 
I strive for emancipation discourses that have an imperial side in favor of the Other 
and an emancipatory side that the West can strive to utilize. I have not obliterated 
inequalities nor have I striven to in my goal. But I demand new inequalities. I demand 
new sources of domination. I demand new forms of domination; new forms of hope. 
 
How will those new inequalities come to be when the current dominating universal is 
quite ‘established’ with its international orders and “justified” domestic intrusions? It 
is going to be the escalation of the fight that I have mentioned.  
 
The Other can speak of freedom in their own terms. The Other can speak of different 
forms of liberation. The Other know they do not need economic growth. Human 
rights discourse can only bring them as much as its imperial side would allow. At the 
end, that side always reminds us “the well-being and the progress of Europe have 
been built up with sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians, and the 
yellow races.”207 The emancipatory side can be effective for a short-term relief, but it 
does not mean more power in the political struggles. To gain power, the Other need 
to fight not only within the human rights discourse but also outside the discourse.  
 
Outside the human rights discourse, there is a brutal fight. It is a fight that does not 
ask for permission to power but takes power. They fight not for rights or for 
development but for their own struggles. The fight is not against domination. They do 
not fight to catch up with the West but fight with the West. “We must refuse outright 
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the situation to which the West wants to condemn us.”208 Fighting does not have to be 
bloody but it will be. For it not to be bloody, “European masses must first of all 
decide to wake up, put on their thinking caps and stop playing the irresponsible game 
of Sleeping Beauty.”209 But if they do not, new languages of emancipation need to 
rise, dominate, acquire power and fight alongside and against the dominant in an 
endless power struggle.  
 
The fight is hopeful and liberating. Though the fight also has its losses. I do not refute 
that it can equate to death. I acknowledge that there are people that cannot afford to 
fight outside human rights discourse. But I also know that rights can only give them 
too little. Though, I cannot urge those who are fighting for survival to fight their own 
way when human rights movement can offer them their survival. I can only tell or ask 
what happens when they survive today to live the same struggles tomorrow. There 
lies hope. Hope is not necessarily a guarantee of survival. I like to articulate hope 
between life and death. Hope lies within the struggles of life. Hope does not lie 
within the fight. It lies in what is after and before the fight. Thus, the fight is 
temporary, a step towards change.210 
 
The tension between life and death is hope. In Islam, martyrdom is celebrated with a 
high place in heaven. But life is also celebrated with all its struggles. The more 
struggles you endure righteously, the more reward you get in your afterlife. I pray for 
both. I pray to live a full life though I strive for the places martyrs go to.  
 
I am relieved that the current political structure is full of rage so mine is not 
shocking; except that it comes from the side deemed to be the Other, for now. 
Folkloric songs must live on.     
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V. Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, I directed my rage towards the limits of contemporary human 
rights movement. Firstly, I opened up the movement to new voices and new 
languages within the human rights discourse. Then I offered a more radical fight for 
acquiring power outside the human rights discourse.  
 
In part one, I introduced the claims of human rights movement: having its own space 
and its concrete objectives that are above politics and morality. I argued that both 
claims are flawed. The movement’s objective entails the activists to choose from 
different interests politically. They favor certain interests to recognize though they do 
not deliver them. They work in a politically institutionalized space. The contingency 
in human rights shows when the movement delivers political gains despite promising 
universal justice. The rights discourse becomes both liberating and imperial. The 
liberating side is jeopardized by the stability of development’s goal: economic 
growth. The rights space is flawed because the movement is grounded through its 
contingency in development and economic growth. Development serves to stabilize 
the universal claim of human rights movement towards its goal of economic growth. 
Development disguises its particularity with the movement’s assumed universality. 
This determination, though promised for all, is unattainable because there are not 
enough resources for us all to live like average Americans. The movement also 
justifies the failures of development. The justifications are part of the devotion to the 
acclaimed universality of the movement. The particularity of the devotion is natural, 
because the rights discourse needs to keep its rhetoric of power. Once the illusions of 
the devotion are shattered, human rights discourse becomes not a true universal but 
acquires the role of representing the universal function.  
 
In part two, I traced a relationship between the universal realm and human rights 
discourse that escalates the contingency in human rights towards its emancipatory 
side. The universal comes from within the plurality of our existence. Our plurality 
does not allow for a true universal. Thus, human rights represent the universal 
function and not true universality. The universal function allows different 
emancipation languages to fight in power struggles for its representation. They can 
  
 
63 
fight within human rights discourse towards a better version of it. In finitude, we 
strive to a better human rights discourse, towards an empty universal, which is 
impossible to reach. Thus, Human rights discourse breaks the assimilation to 
development rationality, in the path towards the empty universal. But there is another 
way to fight. Different emancipation languages can fight against the domination of 
human rights discourse to acquire its status of representing the universal function.  
 
In part three, I urged for a fight outside the human rights movement for creating new 
emancipatory discourses that would fight with human rights discourse to acquire 
power and not just a voice within the movement. I argued the Other should be seen in 
plurality and not in a homogenous identity against the West. The plurality of the Other 
breaks the silences of the weak identities within the category of the Other. 
Nonetheless, I introduced the essentialization of the subaltern identity as a strategy to 
bring struggles to light and unmute them in the plurality within the human rights 
discourse. But, I argued recognition is not enough. It is only a temporary relief in 
power struggles. Projects of emancipations can all fight against the domination of 
human rights without the essentialization of particular identities. They are more 
powerful in their plurality if they choose to fight for domination.  
 
